Notice of Nonsuit – An Order is Necessary

Although a Motion for Nonsuit or a Notice of Nonsuit is effective immediately upon filing, there must still be an order formally dismissing the case.  Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162 reads as follows:

At any time before the plaintiff has introduced all of his evidence other than rebuttal evidence, the plaintiff may dismiss a case, or take a non-suit, which shall be entered in the minutes. Notice of the dismissal or non-suit shall be served in accordance with Rule 21 a on any party who has answered or has been served with process without necessity of court order. Any dismissal pursuant to this rule shall not prejudice the right of an adverse party to be heard on a pending claim for affirmative relief or excuse the payment of all costs taxed by the clerk.  A dismissal under this rule shall have no effect on any motion for sanctions, attorney’s fees or other costs, pending at the time of dismissal, as determined by the court. Any dismissal pursuant to this rule which terminates the case shall authorize the clerk to tax court costs against dismissing party unless otherwise ordered by the court.

The phrase “without necessity of court order” does not mean that an order formally dismissing the case is not necessary.  The Supreme Court of Texas sets forth a particularly good reason why an order is necessary:

The nonsuit extinguishes a case or controversy from the moment the motion is filed or an oral motion is made in open court; the only requirement is the mere filing of the motion with the clerk of the court.[1]

However, the signing of an order dismissing a case, not the filing of a notice of nonsuit, is the starting point for determining when a trial court’s plenary power expires. Appellate timetables do not run from the date a nonsuit is filed, but rather from the date the trial court signs an order of dismissal.[2]

An order is necessary in order to establish appellate deadlines.  In addition, a deadline needs to be established for the court’s plenary powers in light of the balance of Rule 162, which specifically allows the trial court to assess sanctions, attorneys’ fees, and costs after the nonsuit is taken.

The necessity of an order is further reinforced when taking into consideration bogus counterclaims for declaratory relief.  In some cases, a defendant may have good reason to dispute a nonsuit, especially if res judicata may prevent future lawsuits.  In such instances, although a nonsuit has been filed, the trial court will need to determine whether a counterclaim exists that prevents the dismissal of the case as a whole.[3]

If you have anything to add to the topic, please leave a comment in the section below.

[1] Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Estate of Blackmon, 195 S.W.3d 98, 100 (Tex. 2006).

[2] In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Tex. 1997).

[3] See BHP Petroleum Co. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. 1990).

Decoding Chapter 140 of the CPRC

Subrogation

Chapter 140 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code is intended to limit the subrogation rights of an injured person’s health insurance provider.  When this statute was first enacted in 2014, an esteemed personal injury attorney told me that the new law was simple, “Everyone gets a third of the gross settlement.  The insurance company gets a third, the attorney gets a third, and the client gets a third.”  That certainly sounded simple enough.  It was a couple of months later, when applying the new statute to one of my cases, that I realized it was not that simple.  In fact, the “simple” explanation only caused me to question my own analysis of the law.

            After reading Chapter 140 a dozen times and reading a handful of blogs, articles, and CLE papers, I finally realized that all of the commentators were assuming that the plaintiff’s attorney took the case on a 30% contingency.  While that is a safe assumption, Chapter 140 does not actually limit an attorney’s contingency fee to 30%.

You can review the actual wording of Chapter 140 HERE, but allow me to restate the basics in plain language:

Applicability of Chapter:

  1. Plaintiff is injured by Defendant.
  2. Plaintiff is insured by an insurance company described in the statute (there are exceptions).
  3. Insurance pays for healthcare resulting from injury.
  4. Insurance company has subrogation rights.
  5. Plaintiff obtains a recovery from Defendant (i.e., the case settles).

Calculating Insurance Company’s Portion:

  1. When Plaintiff is not represented by an attorney:
    1. Insurance company gets lesser of:
      1. 1/2 gross recovery; or
      2. Total cost of benefits paid
    2. When Plaintiff is represented by an attorney:
      1. Insurance company gets lesser of:
        1. 1/2 gross recovery, minus 1/3 of Insurance Company’s share for the attorney and minus legal expenses; or
        2. Total cost of benefits paid, minus 1/3 of Insurance Company’s share for the attorney and minus legal expenses

As stated previously, these are just the basics; there is a lot more in the statute.  However, this explanation is intended to get past the overly simplistic 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 explanation that was previously given to me.

Let’s apply this explanation to an example:

Paul Plaintiff is injured by Dan Defendant.  Paul’s insurance company pays $50,000 for his healthcare resulting from the injury and asserts its right to subrogation under Paul’s policy.  Paul hires an attorney.  Paul agrees to pay his attorney 40% of his gross recovery plus expenses.  Paul’s attorney settles Paul’s claim against Dan for $90,000.

If my friend were correct, everyone would get $30,000.  The insurance company would have to eat $20,000, and Paul’s attorney would eat $6,000 plus his expenses (let’s say $1,000).  That is incorrect.

According to the statute, the math should look like this:

Insurance company’s portion starts at 1/2 the gross recovery ($45,000).  It is then reduced by a 1/3 ($15,000), and is further reduced by Paul’s legal expenses ($1,000):  $45,000 – $15,000 – $1,000 = $29,000.  The insurance company gets $29,000 and is going to write of $21,000.

Paul’s attorney is going to get 40% of the gross recovery ($36,000), plus his expenses ($1,000), for a total of $37,000.

Paul gets $24,000.

While Paul gets less than everyone else, he is still better off than he would have been under common law, which required the insurance company be made whole.  Under the common law, Paul would have received $3,000 ($90,000 – $50,000 – $37,000 = $3,000).

What does this mean for the practicing attorney?  I think it makes smaller personal injury cases more attractive and easier to settle.  If Paul would have been forced to pay his insurance company $50,000 of the proceeds, Paul’s attorney could never have settled his case for $90,000.  As a result of Chapter 140, Paul and his attorney are happy campers and Dan Defendant’s insurance carrier is also quite pleased.

If you see a flaw in my reasoning or my math, or if you would simply like to share your thoughts, please leave a comment below.

2016 Texas Super Lawyers Rising Star – Jacob D. Thomas

super_lawyers

Saunders, Walsh & Beard would like to congratulate Jacob D. Thomas, a partner at Saunders, Walsh & Beard, for being selected for inclusion in the 2016 Texas Super Lawyers Rising Stars.  This is the second year in a row that Jacob has received this honor.

The Rising Stars are the top up-and-coming Texas attorneys who are 40 or younger or have been in practice for 10 years or less. Rising Stars are selected based on nominations by members of the elite Texas Super Lawyers list. No more than 2.5 percent of Texas attorneys are chosen for this honor.

The full Rising Stars list appears on Superlawyers.com and in the March 2016 issue of Texas Super Lawyers Magazine – Rising Stars.

Jacob D. Thomas has been helping individuals and businesses with their legal needs since 2003. He has a confidence that is earned only through arduous study, preparedness, and experience. With his experience, knowledge and skill, Jacob competently guides his clients through the complex legal system. Whether the situation calls for a hard-nosed fighter or a subtle negotiator, Jacob tailors his approach to each case based upon the particular needs of the client.

Saunders, Walsh & Beard is a multi-practice firm located in McKinney, Texas.  Our AV Preeminent-Rated attorneys handle a broad range of civil litigation, business/commercial planning, real estate, insurance, personal injury and construction law cases.

For more information, please visit www.saunderswalsh.com.

 

Saunders, Walsh & Beard sponsors the 1st Annual Hugs Café Celebration and Benefit in McKinney

Alex Beard, Hugs Cafe's legal advisor and his wife,  Susan Beard with Food Network's Chef Trevor Ball
Alex Beard, Hugs Cafe’s legal advisor and his wife, Susan Beard with Food Network Chef Trevor Ball

Saunders, Walsh & Beard was happy to be a sponsor for the First Annual Hugs Café Celebration and Benefit in McKinney this past Saturday.

Hugs Cafe, Inc. is a Texas nonprofit organization whose primary goal is to empower Special Needs Adults to change their lives for the better by creating jobs and providing extensive training every day.

To learn more about Hugs Café, stop by for a delicious lunch at their Downtown McKinney location or check out their website:  https://hugscafe.org/

Texans “Slap” Back

free speech

Freedom of Speech is Alive and Well in Texas.  The Texas Citizens Participation Act Strikes Again: This time in an HOA dispute.

If you run for office these days, you probably need to have pretty thick skin.  People have always “talked about” leaders, but now with the advent of community websites, neighborhood websites, and texting, information spreads like wildfire.  Even local positions, like little league President or Board Member of your Homeowners Association (HOA), can become hotbeds of controversy.  The information people spread should be relatively accurate (“substantially true” in legal terms), or you can be held liable for defamation of character.   Spreading lies, rumors, or innuendo can get you sued – and rightfully so.  However, I keep coming across cases where people get their feelings hurt over tiny things and they want to run to the courthouse to shut up their opposition; or as they see it “demand justice”- through intimidation. Said another way, they want to file “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation” (SLAPP).

      I just finished handling one such case where a couple of homeowners who were Board members of their local HOA took offense to people questioning their business judgment.   To stop the criticism, they decided to file a lawsuit against their fellow homeowners (and the HOA, and the past Board) for “defamation”, “slander,” and for “ruining their reputation”.

We represented the homeowner that was the alleged “slanderer.” He had disagreed with the approach taken by members of the Board who decided it was best to pay off or “settle” with people who had issues with the Board rather than fight them.  He wrote a strong, but professional letter to the community stating his position that he felt the Board was wasting their money and should be replaced.   This letter was the basis of the “slander” claim as alleged by the Plaintiff.

Unfortunately for the Plaintiff, the letter, while direct, was simply one homeowner exercising   his right of free speech to question the direction of the current Board.

For those of you who follow our blog, you might guess what happened next.   First, we nicely asked them to non-suit the case and pointed out their risks.  They refused to nonsuit (as I’ve found is common, “how could we be wrong?”), and instead demanded money.    I consistently find it revealing when someone who “stands on principle” wants dollars in exchange for his principle.    So we were then forced to ask the Judge to award our client all of his legal fees, costs, and sanctions under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (often referred to as the Anti-SLAPP statute).

We are proud to report, that once again, freedom of speech prevailed.    The   Ellis County Judge defended the right of Texas citizens to exercise their right of freedom of speech.  The case was dismissed and the Plaintiffs were ordered to pay our client’s attorneys’ fees of over $10,000.00 plus costs.  Further, the Judge ordered the Plaintiffs to pay “sanctions” to our client in the amount of $25,000 to deter the Plaintiffs from filing another lawsuit attempting to quash Freedom of Speech.  Hopefully, the Plaintiffs in that suit will reconsider before trying to SLAPP someone in the future; because they learned the hard way: Texans slap back.